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Brandon Claycomb,
Jeffery Nicholas, and
Laurel Smith

History and
Nations in the
Postmodern Era
disClosure interviews
Geoff Eley
(20 January 1998)
Geoff Eley teaches history at the
University of Michigan in Ann Arbor, and is a recognized expert on
nationalism from the dawn of the
Enlightenment era to the present.
Eley is the author of Reshaping the

German Right: Radical Nationalism
and Political Change after Bismarck
(London and New Haven, 1980),
From Unification to Nazism: Reinterpreting the German Past (London,
and
Kontinuitiit
in
1986),
Deutschland (Munster, 1991), and is
co-author with David Blackboum
of The Particularities of German History: Bourgeois Society and Politics in
Nineteenth-Century Gennany (Oxford, 1984). He has also edited with
Ronald Gregory Suny a book entitled Becoming National: A Reader
(Oxford, 1996).
Eley visited the University of
Kentucky campus in January of
1998 to discuss nationalism, with
particular emphasis on Germany.
He took some time from his busy
schedule to discuss various aspects
of his work on nationalism with a
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disClosure interview team. We began with a discussion of an interesting
comment in the introduction to Becoming National, concerning Eley's
call for cultural recovery and the celebration of difference. Our conversation then led quickly to further questions about Eley's position regarding Habermas, and to an elaborate and sometimes personal
discourse on how the postmodern era, both in its academic and his·
toric/national guises, has complicated the work of many historians.

Historical Geneology and Nationalism
disClosure: We would like to open this discussion with a question
about Germany and its so-called Sonderweg, or "special path," to na·
tionhood. You seem to suggest in some of your works that this phrasing
implies an illegitimate ideal of how a nation should develop.
Geoffrey Eley: Exactly. My resistance to calling Germany's history peculiar comes from the conviction that national histories need to be dis·
engaged from developmental schemas that imply sequential movement
from lower to higher s tages. As you point out, I've spent a lot of time
dismantling the extraordinarily well-entrenched comparative frame·
work that sees German "misdevelopment" in relation to a particular
idealization of British and French history. And if we follow the logic of
that critique through, then this presumption of an ideal form of nationbuilding, or of the nation, makes no sense. Part of my default approach
is some notion of combined and uneven development. Whichever particular examples we choose, the global or transnational contexts will always exercise a profound impact on how processes of national state
formation and political development are able to work themselves out.
So the implicit logic of developmental approaches to these questions,
which treat each nation as a discrete entity, seems to me flawed. Of
course, it's really hard to get out of that trap.

dC: You mean the trap of an evolutionary schema?
GE: Yes. Very difficult.

IdC Interviews Geoff Eley
common parlance by the French Revolution. ~at's n~t to deny that
ethnicity plays a role in the sort of struggles you re ta~ng about, b~t I
would want to be as specific as possible about the particular valencies
of the appeals to ethnicity. I'd want to see how the pri~~cy a':~ ex.clusivity of ethnic loyalties have been ~ecured, how ethnic. identifications
have been mobilized so effectively in former Yugoslavia (to use your
example) that now they appear to have displaced other solidarities and
antagonisms from the field.
dC: What kinds of change are the post-communist parts of the world
facing?
GE: There are two main points about post-communism to keep in
mind. First, the regional framework of transnational politics in the
former Soviet Union must be understood not only in relation to the
forms of Russian hegemony and the old Soviet imperium, but also via
the frameworks of interregional cooperation and consciousness. Second, that kind of transnational context has been replaced by a series of
other nascent logics such as marketization and European integration.
Basically, the collapse of those regimes and the political traditions that
carried them has opened up a space in which all sorts of things can happen, most importantly new national identifications. The reintroduction
of national politics is the most obvious new departure.
dC: How do these new nationalisms relate to cultural identities?

GE: The kind of historical genealogy I want to create for understanding
where nations and nationalism come from begins with popular sovereignty, national self-determination, citizenship, and democracy. But in
addition to these characteristics there are a whole culturalist set of languages for understanding nations. Nations are not only composed of
citizens but people who bear the same culture as well (whether we
think that through in terms of ethnicity or something else).
dC: Does that mean one nation, one ethnicity?

dC: But even if one avoided an evolutionary perspective, keeping in
mind your skepticism about treating nations as discrete entities, what
are we to make of ethnicity? Because ethnicity is cited now, not only by
observers, but by participants in struggles for nationhood such as those
that have occurred in the former Yugoslavia. So doesn't ethnicity need
to fit into the framework of nation-forming as that which is proposed to
make a particular nation distinct.
GE: Well, that's really part of the problem, you see. If you look at the
history of nationalism, it's actually a very short history. And ethnicity
has only played a part in that history relatively recently, taking over in
the late nineteenth century for the political values of citizenship made

GE: No. This assumption can be historically dismantled. Initially, in the
context of the French Revolution and the Enlightenment, nations were
defined by citizenship, and nationalism was associated with popular
sovereignty and a political category of citizenship. Ireland, Poland and
Greece are good examples of this. In a lot of ways, Greece is the most
interesting case: the inventors of Greek nationality thought in terms of a
Balkan-wide identity. This projects a political future completely blin.d
to cultural differences. So only further into the 19th century does this
notion of Greece, or of nation-building more generally in Europe, get
grounded in arguments about a cultural identity linked to language, religion, territory, and ethnicity.
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How we answer this question also depends on which particular worldhistorical moment we're looking at. Figuring out the relationship between a cultural formation (like ethno-national identification) and the
longer drawn-out developmental processes (whether we do that in
terms of capitalist development and the logics of economy, or in terms
of class-formation, or by the creation of unitary societies by some other
analytic), is incredibly complex, and how we characterize this relationship (between culture and economy, or culture and society) will also be
influenced by the dialectics of boundedness and territorialization
within an international state system. Judging the valency of ethno-national solidarities will require very different approaches depending on
when we enter this wider process of global development, between the
French Revolution and now. For me, the best way of handling these
questions of general history is to think in terms of European-wide moments of concentrated change. By this I mean those fairly rare conjunctures when European history is genuinely European, when the
landscape is being remade, in all possible dimensions: political, legal,
social, cultural, intellectual. So the key notion is one of continental,
transnational, convulsive revolutionary change, where constitutions
are actually being created, states are being reshaped, and everything
from territorial changes and institutional innovations to fundamental
political realignments and the fashioning of new social blocs is taking
place. This is what I'd call a "constitution-making moment", where the
transformations are generalized and societal, and where the making of
new constitutions in the literal sense usually has a central place.
dC: Could you explain a little more about what you mean when you
speak about "world historical moments" and the "transnational?" How
do these moments fit into your methodology? And do they occur often,
or only very rarely?
GE: There are only a few such periods during the past two hundred
years or so. I would include the French Revolution, the 1860s, the periods at the end of the First and Second World Wars, and most recently
the years 1989-92. Those are the points from which we can develop a
larger contextual argument for Europe as a whole in this transnational
sense, which makes it much easier to handle the meanings of nationhood in a particular place. If we do that, then the terribly abstract definitional discussions that tend to develop when we're dealing with
nation, ethnicity, and all the related concepts, are much easier to sort
out. So when you ask me, for instance, How should we handle these
questions in the breakup of Yugoslavia, I want to step back and consider in the first instance this transnational arena of change, and give
those processes of dissolution their conjunctural and Europeanwide
contexts, to explore them on a transnational scale. I'd want to consider
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this incredibly schematic and inevitablist understanding of where history was headed was difficult to maintain. These developmental
schemas were also horribly contaminated by the imperialisms behind
them. So it was axiomatic for many of us back then that this way of
thinking about history made no sense, either in politics or in theory or
in history. Modernization theory, and the usefulness of the terms "tradition" and "modernity", were seriously discredited. And the standpoint from which that critique was developed was a Marxist one
principally.
So from that point of view, it's been interesting to see social theory, and
to some extent historical work, recur to this older ground. I can understand it in a variety of ways. I think the crisis in Marxism opened a
space in which this approach to theorizing the origins of the contempo·
rary world could return. The discourse of postmodemity has also
brought these issues back on the agenda, because it requires some serious effort at theorizing what precedes the "post", and so the modern of
modernity has found its way back onto the agenda of social and cultural theory. Yet, whether we take Giddens or Bauman or Alexander, or
any of the other social theorists increasingly holding the central ground
in critical social science, this return of the modern as the key term for
understanding the contemporary world and the project of social theory
is no less problematic than it was thirty years ago, particularly when we
look at the conceptions of origins that are implied. For instance,
Giddens talks about modernity in relation to Enlightenment and the
French Revolution in extraordinarily question-begging ways. Of
course, Giddens is a highly sophisticated and seductively lucid and authoritative thinker. But once we push past the theory discourse itself, to
the histories from which modernity supposedly came, we find that
we're reentering very much the old historical arguments about the Enlightenment and French Revolution we were in thirty years ago. There's
a kind of naivete about the historical referents for this incredibly sophisticated theory discourse around the modem and modernity, which
is very ironic.
There's also a disjunction between a theory discourse of that kind and
what historians are thinking about. Of course, there are parts of the profession where those notions of the modem and modernization have
never been abandoned in the first place, including a powerful and centrally positioned figure like Lawrence Stone (who for several decades
was a key voice in Past and Present, and dominated a vital and prestigious institution of the profession, the Davis Center at Princeton, and
who polemicized against "postmodemism" from an older ground of
social science history). But we now have a situation in which a language of tradition, traditional society, and modern society can lapse
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mary text everyone always used to return to, in terms of the contradictions between forces and relations of production. It's one of the clearer
and more sophisticated statements in Marx describing the base-superstructure framework and how you can translate that into projects of historical analysis. That essay that came out in the late eighties was the last
point at which I was comfortable conceptualizing my work, whether in
the German historical context or elsewhere, in that kind of way.
Everything that's happened since, in theory and in the world, has made
it very difficult to proceed in that way, and it's very unclear to me how
we should deal with those questions now. The critique of grand narratives has made it enormously complicated. For instance, nobody among
those who would have called themselves Marxists twenty years ago
talks about the transition debate any more, the transition from feudalism to capitalism, whereas when I came into history in the late sixties
and early seventies. That's where many of the interesting questions
were located. As I was learning about the big debates among European
historians, between the ages of 18 and 25, these were the exciting controversies- the general crisis of the seventeenth century, the rise of the
world system, the formation of absolutist states, the social interpretation of the Reformation, as well as the transition debate and the nature
of bourgeois revolutions-I cut my teeth on. In the meantime, any attempt among historians to understand big political processes of change
(like the rise of absolutism, the political instabilities of the seventeenth
century, or the French Revolution) in relation to societal processes of
development and crisis (like the growth of capitalism) has been undermined. The social interpretation of the French Revolution has been systematically assaulted. There's no shortage of post-Foucauldian grand
narratives of social power and govemmentality for ordering the histories of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, it's true, but this new
cultural history has very little interest in the relationship of politics to
social forces in the classical sense, and in any case Foucault had his own
unreflected assumptions about the relationship of capitalism and the
rise of the bourgeoisie to the production of the modem. Historical sociologists (Charles Tilly, Michael Mann, John Hall, many others) have
continued the classical tradition of writing about state formation, but
by now there's very little engagement of historians per se with this
project.
As I mentioned earlier, these notions of modernity have come back in
social theory, and one of the things I've been trying to do in the las t decade or so is to figure out how they can be sensibly historicized. Otherwise, they just won't prove tenable for long. So I've spent a lot of time
with the theory discourse of the postmodern, and with those areas of
social and cultural theory that have been circulating around these con-
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Do you see any problems with this limited descriptive possibility?
GE: Well, the really useful and exciting thing about Habermas' idea of
the public sphere to me always had to do with how it was grounded in
arguments about cultural formation and political development in
highly materialist ways. If you go back to the public sphere book, the
argument begins with these notions of transition from feudalism to
capitalism, and he has a particular model of the formation of commercial society for understanding those transformations. But it b egins with
those big processes of societal change, the growth of markets, the development of commerce and all the institutional developments that they
presuppose in terms of the organization of markets, of communications, of the creation of newspapers. The Structural Transforma tion of tire
Public Sphere is very grounded in these kinds of arguments. So what I
liked about the Habermas notion of Offentlichkeit and the public sphere
was that it definitely implied a social history rather than jus t an argument about ideas. And a lot of the stuff about associational life and the
circulation of ideas inside a particular infrastructural environment of
social organization and social exchange is right there in the public
sphere book.
dC: Looking back on The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere,
how do you view it as a Marxian historian?

GE: You know that my essay was originally produced for a conference
that accompanied the English translation of the public sphere book, in
September 1989, and part of my charge was to provide some of the
historicized argumentation for that conference. So it was pretty interesting going back to that book and finding that it so impressively
grounded in relation to the historical work then available, which wasn't
all that much, since this was the late 1950s and early 1960s. One of the
most striking things for me, when I was doing that work, was the degree to which one could take the best social historical research and writing that's been done in the meantime, say on eighteenth-century
Britain, and redescribe it in terms provided by Habermas' book, and
thereby reformulate the questions posed by Habermas given his historical argumentation. But returning to the earlier concern abou t the
public sphere glorifying ideas, it's never about ideas for me, divorced
from these kinds of social histories. The beauty of the concept is that it
contained an argumentation about the emergence of modern politics, in
particular of liberalism and radical democracy- these key terms of
modern political life- that's precisely grounded in materialist social
history and a broader conception of public action.
dC: From what you have said here, it seems as if you are trying to embrace both postmodernism and modernism. Let's turn for a moment to
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another to present politics as located in the political process narrowly
understood-parties, legislatures, government. And I think that is still
a problem. That is an abiding problem of our contemporary under·
standing of politics too, in terms of commonsensical understandings.
What I've always liked about the term "public sphere" as a theory term,
as a framework that we can take from Habermas, is that it provides a
way of conceptualizing an expanded notion of the political. It forces us
to look for politics in other social places. That is useful not only for producing these histories of the eighteenth and nineteenth century. It is
also useful for activating people's sense of their own citizenship now.
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GE: In terms of being able to say: Look, the "public sphere" is a space
between state and society in which political action occurs, w ith real
effectivities, whether it's in terms of local effects or building a sense of
political agency, or behaving ethically in one's social relations and allowing some notion of collective goods to be posed, and thereby contributing to wider processes of political mobilization. It's one way of
making connections between what we think and do in everyday life, including the personal sphere, and the world of politics, when in popular
perceptions politics has been degenerating more and more into a word
for corruption and self-interestedness and a machinery of privilege, influence and wheeler-dealing beyond realistic popular control. It's a
way of restoring intelligibility to the political process in that sense, and
of reclaiming politics for a realistic discourse of democracy. And that's
pretty useful in a context where there's depressingly extensive cynicism
about the ability to have any kind of political effect, where the degree of
disaffection and cynicism and sense of disablement, politically, or in relation to notions of one's agency as a citizen, when that sense of disablement is so extensive. And I should say here that we owe this ability to
remake the connections between everydayness and politics especially
to feminism, and all the ways in which feminist theory and politics
have turned the relationship of the personal and the political inside out
since the explosions of 1968. It's feminism that's activated this relationship and allowed Habermas's idea to be redeployed so valuably over
the past decade.
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So this term "public sphere"- as the starting point for the kind of argumentation we've been alluding to, about what politics is, where it takes
place, and how it can be understood, as a space available to ordinary
people and not just the official politicians- this term is a pretty useful
term for re-energizing a sense of citizenship that's active and can make
a difference, whether it's the public sphere of particular institutions like
universities or professions, or local public spheres. So when I said that
the public sphere makes more sense as a structured setting, where con-
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intellectuals. As you can tell, Lukacs' quip about the grand hotel of despair is one that I still have a lot of sympathy for.
dC: So Horkheimer or Adorno blasted Jazz as empty expression, lacking the possibility for positive political action. But today that just
sounds like pompous dismissal of popular cultural activity and p erformance because it doesn't qualify as art. Do you think the postmodern
turn has amended this conception of popular culture as impotent,
kitschy everydayness?

GE: Yes. One of the most important consequences of postmodemism
and cultural studies is their willingness to take popular culture seriously as a site of political action and engagement, really for the first
time in the history of the Left. Going back through the last century of
the history of the Left, it's extremely hard to find any willingness to engage seriously with popular culture in such a way. Even if you go back
to the period of the formation of socialist parties, you don't find the attempt to get inside popular culture and appreciate its positive capacities until at least 1968. And postmodernism and cultural studies are
certainly the academic heirs to the heritage of '68.
dC: Yet some forms of postmodernism also seem to demand the abandonment of grand history, metanarrative, and even the possibility of
radical social change. Doesn't that suggest that postmodernism also
questions the possibility of political action in everyday activity, perhaps as much as Horkheimer and Adorno, although for different reasons?

GE: Well, I'm not sure the one follows from the other. On the one hand,
we have reason to be skeptical about grand narratives, in large part because of the difficulty of establishing clear causal relationships in terms
of the models of determination that were available to us in the Marxist
tradition. So this skepticism is about political change of the most fundamental and far-reaching kinds, whether in the context of revolution or
long-run structural processes of social development and change. Consequently, theorizing that relationship now that base and superstructure frameworks are no longer persuasive has fallen into disrepute.
We've all backed off from that.
However, that doesn't mean that large-scale political change no longer
occurs. And one of the extraordinary things about living through the
last decade has been the reminder that big changes do happen, after all,
and we shouldn't be fooled by the inevitable disappointments of the
messiness and limited nature of the democratic advan ces immediately
registered after 1989 in the former Soviet Union and Eastern Europe
into concluding that everything has stayed really the same. Quite aside
from the dramatic legal and constitutional changes of 1989-90 them-
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contemporary project of the Left's rethinking popular culture along
postmodern lines. We don't get very far in specifying the kinds of poli·
tics that work in this new environment if we just stick with the strategies and concepts that are given to us by the tradition, whether
Marxism, other radicalisms, or social democracy. On the other hand, if
we acknowledge that politics is located elsewhere now, that doesn't
mean that all of those given concepts and strategies are obsolete. I certainly don't think, for example, that class has become an inoperative
term of politics. It's the insufficiencies of those given terms that need to
be faced and rethought.
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